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Abstract— Recent work has shown that it is possible to learn
neural networks with provable guarantees on the output of
the model when subject to input perturbations, however these
works have focused primarily on defending against adversarial
examples for image classifiers. In this paper, we study how
these provable guarantees can be naturally applied to other
real world settings, namely getting performance specifications
for robust virtual sensors measuring fuel injection quantities
within an engine. We first demonstrate that, in this setting,
even simple neural network models are highly susceptible to
reasonable levels of adversarial sensor noise, which are capable
of increasing the mean relative error of a standard neural
network from 6.6% to 43.8%. We then leverage methods for
learning provably robust networks and verifying robustness
properties, resulting in a robust model which we can provably
guarantee has at most 16.5% mean relative error under any
sensor noise. Additionally, we show how specific intervals of fuel
injection quantities can be targeted to maximize robustness for
certain ranges, allowing us to train a virtual sensor for fuel
injection which is provably guaranteed to have at most 10.69%
relative error under noise while maintaining 3% relative error
on non-adversarial data within normalized fuel injection ranges
of 0.6 to 1.0.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although neural networks have made remarkable progress
in achieving state-of-the-art performance in vision and lan-
guage tasks over recent years, other domains have been com-
paratively slower at incorporating these types of models into
their systems. For higher-states applications such as those
in driving, security, or health care systems, the lack of per-
formance guarantees and the inability to interpret the model
constitute critical shortcomings that prevent neural networks
from being more widely adopted. The unpredictability and
brittleness of neural networks is exemplified by a now
well-studied phenomenon called adversarial examples [1],
where datapoints that look indistinguishable from “normal”
examples are specifically perturbed to be misclassified by
machine learning systems. These adversarial examples orig-
inally focused on `∞-bounded perturbations, which model
a small amount of noise added to each pixel in the vision
setting [2], but have since expanded to other perturbations
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ranging from imperceptible perturbations such as `p-bounded
additive noise [3], [4], [5], image transformations such as
rotations or translations [6], [7], and Wasserstein perturba-
tions [8], [9], to more visible, real-world perturbations such
as adversarial stickers [10], [11], clothing [12], glasses [13],
and textures [14].
As a result, a natural prerequisite towards deploying neural
networks in higher-stakes applications is to learn a model
which performs well not just under the typical setting of test-
set performance, but to also be robust to perturbed inputs. To
this end, there has been a great deal of work towards training
networks which are not only empirically robust [15], [16], but
also provably robust [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], the latter of
which is able to give provable guarantees on the performance
of the neural network against any perturbation within a given
set. Although these methods could potentially be used to
verify crucial safety and reliability requirements in other
domains, provably robust training methods have largely been
focused on vision and language domains [22], where they are
largely limited to medium-scale networks and haven’t seen
much use outside the context of defending against adversarial
examples.
In this paper, we study how provably robust networks
can be leveraged for real-world problems beyond adversarial
examples in vision and language problems. Specifically, we
focus on the problem of learning a virtual sensor for use in an
engine controller, where the goal is to learn a model which
accurately estimates the amount of fuel which was injected
into the engine of a vehicle based on various sensors read-
ings. Although a virtual sensor for fuel injection may never
be subject to worst-case adversarial examples in the real
world, reliably and robustly predicting accurate fuel injection
quantities under noisy conditions has direct consequences
on fuel efficiency and engine safety. Consequently, provable
guarantees against adversarial examples can be leveraged
not as a defense mechanism against adversarial examples,
but instead as a way to learn model specifications which
guarantee certain levels of performance of the neural network
under entire sets of noise.
We first demonstrate that even simple neural network
models suffer from adversarial examples in this setting,
where perturbed sensor readings can drastically degrade
the model performance from 6.6% to 43.8% mean relative
error, subject to sensor perturbations of 1% for time series
data from one sensor and 0.1% for data from a second
sensor. To improve the robustness of the neural network
and obtain performance guarantees, we adapt provably robust
training methods based on duality [17], [18] to the regression
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setting, and train a provably robust model which achieves
only 16.4% mean relative error when subject to adversarial
sensor perturbations. More importantly, the provably robust
and verification methods developed for adversarial examples
produce bounds which are specifications on the worst-case
performance of the model: our virtual sensor is provably
guaranteed to have at most 16.5% mean relative error under
these noise levels. Finally, in some scenarios, it may be
desirable to have a model which has better performance
specifications within a limited output range instead, rather
than having overall robustness across the entire output range.
We show how the robustness of the virtual sensor can be
tuned to target a limited set of output ranges, resulting in a
model which achieves 3% relative test error and is provably
guaranteed to have at most 10.69% worst-case relative error
when predicting normalized fuel injection quantities 0.6 and
1.0 under any sensor noise. Notably, this is comparable in
performance to that of non-robust standard training, which
achieves 2.7% relative error within the same output range but
with a worse guarantee of 17.78% worst-case relative error.
II. BACKGROUND
After their initial discovery [1], adversarial examples were
initially generated by using a single gradient step called
the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [2], which was later
improved by adding randomized initialization [23], taking
multiple smaller steps [24], and using momentum [25]. By
training on the adversarially perturbed examples instead
of the original examples, it is possible to learn models
which are empirically robust to an adversarial attack, also
known as adversarial training. Training against a projected
gradient descent adversary is recognized as one of the earliest
known defenses against adversarial examples that remains
robust to this day [15], and has been further improved in
subsequent work to achieve higher performance [16], gener-
alize to different threat models [4], [5], and combine with
other heuristic defenses [26], [27]. Variations of adversarial
training were proposed to speed up the process, such as
free adversarial training [28], reducing the complexity of
computing gradients [29], and a return to single step FGSM
adversarial training [30].
Other methods beyond adversarial training for mitigating
the effect of adversarial examples include preprocessing
techniques [31], [32], [33] and detection algorithms [34],
[35]. However, a significant number of defenses against
adversarial examples [36], [37], [38], [39] were ultimately
shown to be ineffective [40], [41], [42], [43], [44], and
several papers began defeating adversarial defenses en masse
[45], [46] as well as recommending best practices to ensure
a proper evaluation for adversarial defenses [47].
Some work has looked into designing unbreakable de-
fenses known as provable or certified defenses against ad-
versarial attacks for neural networks. In contrast to other
approaches, these methods calculate a guaranteed bound on
the output of the network over some region of the input
space, typically taken to be an `p ball around a data point.
Some of these bounds can be computationally expensive
and can only be used to verify trained networks, relying on
satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers [48], [49], [50],
mixed integer linear programming (MILP) [51], semidefinite
programming [52], and linear programming [17], [53]. Other
bounds which are looser but more efficiently computable can
actually be optimized during training, utilizing techniques
for distributional robustness [54], duality [17], [18], more
efficient semidefinite programming formulations [55], ab-
stract interpretations [56], [57], interval bound propagation
[58], and randomized smoothing [59], [60]. Other work has
designed theoretically motivated training heuristics which
can be independently verified at test time as being robust
[61], [62].
Beyond adversarial examples, other relevant work includes
those studying model verification in contexts beyond im-
age classification, typically within the context of controller
verification. To name a few, hybrid controllers for auto-
mated highway systems were verified to be safe by design
with game theoretic techniques [63], and frameworks for
verifying controller software for manufacturing plants were
developed for programmable logic controllers [64]. While
some work has looked at verifying properties of neural
networks for safety critical applications, they are mostly
limited to measuring the confidence and monitoring the
performance of an existing neural network without offering
any formal guarantees [65], [66]. Most relevant to our work
are those which give provable guarantees for neural network
models, such as using bounded model checking techniques
to verify safety properties of a controller for the classic
Cart Pole System (inverted pendulum) with an SMT solver
[67], as well as recent work which verified the safety of
an autonomous robot controller using satisfiability modulo
convex optimization [68].
III. ROBUST FUEL INJECTION
Unlike past work which has largely focused on large-scale
image classification, in this paper we study the regression
problem of learning a neural network virtual sensor for fuel
injection. The virtual sensor system predicts the amount of
injected fuel during a specific time interval, based on two
sensors. The first sensor provides a time series of sensor data
while the second sensor is essentially constant within the
time interval. More accurate fuel injection predictions result
in better fuel efficiency and safety considerations, however
the sensor readings are subject to measurement noise. The
goal is to not only train a neural network which accu-
rately predicts fuel injection quantities while being robust
to measurement noise from the sensors, but to also generate
certificates which can guarantee the worst-case performance
of the model under noise and serve as a certified specification
for the model.
To train a neural network robust to noise, we leverage
duality-based methods for learning provably robust networks
[17], [18], which converts inputs, layers, and the loss into
their dual components to construct a bound on the output of
the network. Specifically, for a given neural network f and
input x, these methods are able to compute a bound J(x)
on the worst case output of the network subject to some
perturbation set B(x) around x
max
z∈B(x)
f(z) · c ≤ J(x; c) (1)
for any constant c (we use a network with one output unit for
simplicity as that is sufficient for our regression setting, but
the original approach from [18] applies to multiple outputs).
By choosing c = {−1, 1}, one can compute upper and lower
bounds on the output of a neural network.1
To adapt the method to the regression setting, we can
use the duality-based method to directly compute lower and
upper bounds on the output to the network and use these to
compute a bound on the mean squared error. Specifically, let
` ≤ min
z∈B(x)
f(z), max
z∈B(x)
f(z) ≤ u (2)
be lower and upper bounds (`, u) on the output of a network
f subject to perturbations in B(x) around an example x.
Then, we can bound the worst-case mean squared error
within the same set B(x) with respect to the output y with
max
z∈B(x)
(f(z)− y)2 ≤ max((`− y)2, (u− y)2) (3)
which we will call robust mean squared error. Training
provably robust regression models then amounts to running
backpropagation on the robust mean squared error, and the
lower and upper bounds serve as guaranteed certificates on
the output of the neural network.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Fuel injection data
We begin with a brief description of the fuel injection
dataset used in this work. The features consist of a time
sequence of K − 1 readings of the first sensor and an
additional reading of the second sensor, resulting in a feature
vector of dimension K. The input features as well as the
output are all normalized, resulting in a range from 0 to 1.
We collected 20,000 data points for a training set, and 1,000
data points for a test set.
B. Architecture, parameters, and evaluation metrics
We adopt fairly standard practices for training the neural
network, which we outline here. The fuel injection virtual
sensor is a neural network with a single hidden layer with
32 units and ReLU non-linearities. Note that the size of
the architecture must be relatively small and simple to
accomodate the engine controller. We train the network for
1000 epochs with minibatch size 512, using a stochastic
gradient descent optimizer with momentum set to 0.9 using
a cyclic learning rate [69] which peaks at 0.035 at the
250th epoch. We report mean relative error (MRE), which
is computed for examples {xi, yi}i=1...n on a given neural
network f as
MRE(f) =
1
n
∑ |f(xi)− yi|
|yi| (4)
1These bounds are computed with the open-source implementation of the
duality based approach available at https://github.com/locuslab/
convex adversarial
Fig. 1. Test performance of a standard (non-robust) model over the range
fuel injection quantities. Each point represents a single example, where the
vertical axis denotes the relative error of the model and the horizontal
axis denotes the target output quantity to be predicted as a fraction of
the maximum possible value. The gray lines denote margins of allowable
relative error, met by most of the data in the upper ranges.
We also report the mean error under noise, where noise is
drawn uniformly at random from the perturbation set and
performance is averaged over 1000 draws, as well as the em-
pirical adversarial error rate from a PGD adversary. Finally,
we report exact verification results from a MILP solver and
the looser duality based bound on the worst-case adversarial
error rate, which constitute our provable guarantees on the
performance of the controller. All experiments are compactly
summarized in Table I.
Training the fuel injection virtual sensor on this data
using standard methods (minimizing mean squared error)
achieves a network with 6.6% mean relative error, and
under 3% mean relative error for the fuel injection range
of 0.6 to 1.0. A scatter plot depicting the test error over
different fuel injection quantities is shown in Figure 1. In
addition to a standard model, we also train a model with
data augmentation with non-adversarial noisy examples as
an additional natural baseline. Noise for each example was
uniformly randomly sampled from the target perturbation set,
and the resulting trained model obtains similar relative error
to the standard baseline but has slightly better performance
against random noise.
C. Adversarial examples for fuel injection systems
We first demonstrate the vulnerability of the neural net-
work virtual sensor to adversarial examples when trained
using standard methods. Based on the noise levels observed
in the sensor measurements, we assume a noise level of 1%
for each entry in the time series of the first sensor and 0.1%
for the entry of the second sensor, which constitutes the set
of allowable perturbations that we wish to be robust to, and
additionally clip the perturbed features to stay within the
normalized range of 0 to 1. To generate adversarial examples
and find worst-case perturbations, we use a 10 step projected
gradient descent (PGD) adversary with step size 0.25% for
the time series features and 0.025% for the remaining feature.
We immediately find that both baselines (standard training
and noisy training) are highly susceptible to adversarial
examples, with the standard model having mean relative error
increased from 6.61% to 43.88%, while the model trained
on noisy examples fairs slightly better, going from 6.79% to
33.38% mean relative error. An example of an adversarially
perturbed time series sequence is depicted in Figure 2.
TABLE I
FUEL INJECTION PERFORMANCE OVER VARIOUS FUEL INJECTION RANGES AND TRAINING METHODS
[0.0-0.2) [0.2-0.4) [0.4-0.6) [0.6-0.8) [0.8-1.0] [0.0-1.0]
Standard training
Relative error 15.96% 8.17% 4.52% 2.87% 2.53% 6.61%
Noise error 22.89% 9.94% 5.70% 3.77% 3.13% 8.76%
PGD error 119.03% 46.94% 28.15% 19.39% 14.74% 43.88%
MILP bound 125.43% 48.39% 28.89% 19.82% 15.14% 45.63%
Dual bound 139.48% 52.96% 31.21% 21.31% 16.25% 50.09%
Noise data augmentation
Relative error 15.63% 8.64% 5.00% 2.93% 2.61% 6.79%
Noise error 18.89% 9.47% 5.60% 3.50% 2.97% 7.86%
PGD error 85.26% 35.92% 23.05% 16.04% 12.56% 33.38%
MILP bound 91.05% 37.36% 23.98% 16.53% 12.90% 35.07%
Dual bound 109.61% 41.90% 26.03% 18.06% 14.19% 40.29%
Robust training
Relative error 19.79% 11.45% 9.50% 7.32% 6.76% 10.78%
Noise error 20.17% 11.57% 9.54% 7.35% 6.79% 10.89%
PGD error 34.13% 17.05% 13.40% 10.37% 8.98% 16.40%
MILP bound 34.52% 17.12% 13.46% 10.41% 9.05% 16.51%
Dual bound 35.09% 17.37% 13.86% 10.66% 9.22% 16.84%
Targeted robust training
Relative error 14.33% 7.31% 5.71% 3.24% 2.78% 6.53%
Noise error 20.68% 8.76% 6.31% 3.64% 3.03% 8.21%
PGD error 102.70% 35.85% 20.41% 11.76% 8.92% 34.26%
MILP bound 107.48% 37.16% 20.91% 11.97% 9.03% 35.55%
Dual bound 118.42% 40.84% 22.43% 12.59% 9.34% 38.78%
Fig. 2. An example of an adversarially perturbed time series sequence for
a non-robust fuel injection controller, where the horizontal axis denotes
time and the vertical axis denotes the sensor reading. The dark blue
line denotes the true underlying signal, while the gray line denotes the
adversarially perturbed signal. The light blue region denotes the set of
allowable perturbations. This adversarial perturbation, which is well within
the realm of reasonable sensor noise, increases the relative error of a
standard model on this example from 4% to 15%
D. Robust training and duality-base certificates
We next train a model using provably robust training
methods adapted to the regression problem by minimizing
the robust mean squared error as discussed in Section III. As
expected, the robustly trained model has the most resilience
to adversarial attacks, achieving 16.40% mean relative error
under adversarial perturbations, significantly better than the
baselines. Furthermore, the robust training method comes
with a duality based bound which is a provable upper bound
on the relative error of the neural network over the perturba-
tion set. We find that the robustly trained network has a dual
bound which guarantees at most 16.84% worst-case mean
relative error, which is a significantly better guarantee than
the dual bound evaluated on the standard and noisy baselines
which can only guarantee at most 50.09% and 40.29% worst-
case mean relative error respectively. However, this comes at
a cost: the performance on unperturbed examples is degraded
to 10.78%, approximately 4% worse than the standard model.
Fig. 3. Test performance of a model targeted to be robust over the higher
range of fuel injection quantities. Each point represents a single example,
where the vertical axis denotes the relative error of the model and the
horizontal axis denotes the target output quantity to be predicted as a fraction
of the maximum possible value. The gray lines denote margins of allowable
relative error, met by most of the data in the upper ranges.
E. Exact robustness verification
Due to the small size of the network, it is computationally
feasible calculate the exact worst case performance within
the perturbation set, using an MILP solver [51]. Verifying
all of the examples in the test set for a single model takes
approximately 15-20 minutes. We find that the MILP bound
is slightly tighter for the baseline, improving their verified
performance by about 5% mean relative error each, whereas
the dual bound for the robustly trained network is already
nearly tight and closely matches the MILP bound.
F. Targeted robust training
Finally, depending on the desired specifications of the
model, it may be acceptable for the virtual sensor to perform
well only on certain output ranges of fuel injection. For
example, in our setting, it is typical for performance in the
upper ranges (e.g. 0.6-1.0) of fuel injection to carry higher
importance than the lower ranges (e.g. 0.0-0.6), and so one
might wish to maximize robustness only within this range.
However, training on the full range of fuel injection data
is still necessary to achieve good generalization on the test
set. To balance this trade-off between standard performance
and robustness among the higher ranges of fuel injection, we
train on a convex combination of the standard mean squared
error of the entire training data and the robust mean squared
error of the targeted subset of the training data. Specifically,
for a dataset (X,Y ), we minimize the following targeted loss
`tar(f(X), Y ) = λ`(f(X), Y )+ (1−λ)`rob(f(Xtar), Ytar)
(5)
where ` is the standard loss (mean squared error), `rob is
the robust loss (robust mean squared error), (Xtar, Ytar) are
the targeted subsets of the original dataset (data points with
fuel injection targets from 0.6-1.0), and λ is a hyperparameter
used to control the balance between robustness and accuracy.
Setting λ = 0.8, we are able to train a robust fuel injection
virtual sensor which is specifically trained to be robust within
the range 0.6-1.0. In fact, with this trade off we are able
to nearly match the original standard performance of the
baseline standard model with 6.53% mean relative error
on unperturbed examples. Figure 3 depicts the performance
of the targeted robust model over various fuel injection
quantities, where the model is in fact able to achieve low
relative error within the range of 0.6-1.0.
While it achieves similar relative error to the standard
model, more importantly, we find that the model trained
with targeted robust training achieves better verified robust
performance. The guarantees obtained by the targeted robust
model within the range of 0.6-1.0 are nearly on par with
the model trained with pure robust training, achieving a
guarantee of at most 10.69% worst-case relative error within
the perturbation set for higher injection quantities, without
sacrificing standard performance.
V. CONCLUSION
Although work in adversarial robustness has largely fo-
cused on large-scale vision problems, in this work we showed
how provably robust methods can be leveraged for smaller,
model verification problems in the regression setting to
get provable specifications. Specifically, we showed how
methods from duality-based approaches for training provably
robust neural networks can be used to train robust virtual
sensors for fuel injection with guarantees on the performance
under noise. While focusing solely on robust performance
results in a degradation of standard performance, if perfor-
mance on only a subset of the target range is desired, then
it is possible to get the best of both worlds and achieve
competitive standard performance while improving robust
guarantees on the target range. We hope that this work
opens up more higher-stakes applications to using neural
network models by demonstrating that neural networks can
be trained to have reasonable provable guarantees that restore
confidence in their ability to perform robustly and reliably.
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